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An Employee Stock Ownership Plan: The History of
the Weirton Steel Buy-Out
A leveraged employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a congressionally sanctioned technique of corporate financing which attempts
to transfer controlling blocks in a corporation from outside stockholders to the employees of the corporation. Proponents argue that
such plans not only produce considerable tax advantages and a
redistribution of wealth but also increase the productivity of the
employees. Such plans must be well-defined and tailored to the right
type of business. On the other hand, employees threatened by plant
closings, must realize that an employee buy-out is not a magical
panacea which can resurrect a dying industry. This comment traces
the history of the formation and development of the Weirton Steel
Corporation's Employee Stock Ownership Plan, the world's largest
one hundred percent employee buy-out. Since its creation in 1983,
the employee-owned Weirton Steel has been able to post consecutive
quarterly profits. Although the verdict is still outstanding as to its
continued viability, its success illustrates the long range advisability
of obtaining expert assistance in researching and formulating an
ESOP. These techniques not only help evaluate the feasibility of
establishing an ESOP but also help eliminate potential legal, as well
as labor, conflicts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

At 9:10 a.m. on March 2, 1982, a date residents of Weirton, West
Virginia, enunciate still with death-like exactness, Mr. Howard M.
Love, President of National Steel Corporation (National), stood
solemnly at the end of the board room table and pronounced a death
knoll for the corporation's Weirton Steel Division (Weirton).' "Citing
the prolonged recessionary business climate, the pressure of lower
cost imported steel, accelerated changes in consumption patterns
favoring substitute materials for steel,' '2 and the resulting financial

1. Interview with David L. Robertson, former Counsel for the Independent
Steelworkers Union (ISU), in Weirton, West Virginia, (March 13, 1987) [hereinafter
Robertson Interview].
2. Disclosure Document, Weirton Joint Study Committee, Inc., Weirton
Steel Company (August 19, 1983) 7 [hereinafter Disclosure Document].
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losses, President Love indicated that the corporation was taking the
advice of its consultant, Bain and Company, and was planning to
down-size its involvement in steel. 3 Therefore, National had decided
not to spend the substantial capitalization needed to keep Weirton
competitive on an international basis. Love stated that National had
four possible options: (1) to sell the Weirton plant outright, (2) to
close the plant immediately, (3) to harvest or down-size the plant,
or (4) to offer the plant for sale to Weirton employees under an
4
ESOP.
This announcement should not have come as a complete surprise.
Discerning eyes would have noticed the signs long before the announcement-the decline in new investment, the orders that increasingly were being funneled to other mills in National's corral, the
engineers from the corporation's headquarters who arrived to examine
old equipment with the meticulousness of an appraiser preparing for
an estate sale. 5
Moreover, the precarious position of steel in the world outside
Weirton was emanating ominous and foreboding signs: continual
news releases of nearby plant closings, the omnipresence of foreign
cars on the highway, and the ever-increasing use of aluminum in
manufacturing soft cans which usurped the market from Weirton's
specialty-steel cans made from tinplate. Nevertheless, National's
announcement sent a shock wave through the 25,000 inhabitants of
Weirton, a town totally dominated by the 400 acre mill. Love's
meeting took only twenty minutes; however, those present immediately perceived the enormity of the impending crisis. 6 This was not
a management ploy or a prelude for wage and benefit concessions.
At the outset, Love had commented that the Board of Directors had
already indicated that even a wage concession of ten dollars per hour
7
would be refused.
For the next ninety minutes, the twenty-two members of the
executive board of the Independent Steel Union (ISU), the five
members" from the Independent Guard Union (IGU), and the eight
members of Weirton's management discussed their options.8 Consid3. Robertson Interview, supra note 1.
4. Letter from ISU to the Reagan administration (April 22, 1982) (discussing
EPA relief for new mill).
5. Rowe, Weirton Steel: Buying Out the Bosses, The Washington Monthly
34 (January 1984).
6. Robertson Interview, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id. The ISU represents hourly employees and the IGU represents salaried
employees.
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ering the unhealthy business climate of domestic steel combined with
the substantial capitalization needed to modernize the Weirton plant,
the group realized that finding a suitable buyer was not a viable
alternative. Closing the plant, on the other hand, was unrealistic
from both National's as well as Weirton's vantage point. Generous
lay-off, severance, and pension provisions in the existing collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) would ultimately cost National almost
750 million dollars. 9 Not only did National have less than half that
amount in reserve to cover such liabilities but also since National
was not paying any corporate taxes, the corporation could not use
the closure of Weirton as a tax write-off.10 Thus, National financially
could not afford to close the plant. Obviously, Weirton's employees
were equally adamant in negating this option. The third option,
down-sizing the plant, would convert the integrated steel mill to a
finishing mill, reducing employment from 7,500 to 1,000 employees."
Such an alternative would create an industrial ghost town and destroy
2
the largest single location employer in the state of West Virginia.'
Obviously, the fourth option, the purchase of the plant under an
ESOP, demanded consideration. To those assembled, the term was
at best an enigma, if not an entirely unknown quantity. Yet here in
the midst of imminent destruction appeared one small hope of life.
The only chance of survival, the hope of rebirth, became a mysterious
phoenix called ESOP.

II. THE PIuosopny BEHIND AN ESOP
For the next eighteen months, those assembled struggled with this
phoenix, this ESOP. The philosophy for the term, an acronym for
employee stock ownership plan, began in the 19th Century. "Although the origins of the ESOP philosophy can be traced to 19th
Century writings of Johann Heinrich von Thunen, the generally
recognized creator of the concept today is the lawyer-economist Louis
0. Kelso. 3 In an analysis of Kelso's theory in the University of

Michigan's

JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM,

Luis L. Granados points out

9. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby Actuarial Study, prepared by Towers,
Perrin, Forster, & Crosby for the ISU, (November 9, 1982) (relating to the Division's
Pension Plan) [hereinafter Towers Actuarial Study].
10.
11.

See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
Robertson Interview, supra -note 1.

12.
13.

Id.
Granados, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An Analysis of Current

Reform Proposals, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 15, 16 (1980) [hereinafter Granados].
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that Kelso felt that there were two factors at work in the production
of goods and services: (1) a person's labor and (2) physical tools, or
capital. 4 As modern society has watched the steady shifting away
from labor toward the capital side, our outtake system no longer
reflects the realities of our input system. 5 Most employees receive
"their income solely from their contribution of labor, owning virtually no capital whatsoever.' ' 6 On the other hand, employers who
are able to separate the two Kelsonian factors have concluded that
the owner "of the machine is entitled to the wealth the machine
creates . . ..
".
,7 The result has concentrated the wealth of America
into the hands of a few. "Federal government figures show that one
percent of the American people own over fifty percent of privatelyheld corporate wealth, while six percent of the people own over
seventy percent of it.""I Such inequity has contributed to much of
the social difficulty experienced by today's society. 9 Thus, Kelso's
solution turned upon some type of employee ownership which would
20
spread out the wealth derived from ownership of private property.
III.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN

ESOP

From Kelso's theory evolved the modern day concept of ESOP.
Its historical groundwork began in a 1953 Revenue Ruling which
allowed leveraging by a stock bonus plan, thereby providing employer
financing repayable with pre-tax corporate dollars. 21 By 1956, Kelso
had formed his first ESOP, which saved a small newspaper from a
take-over attempt by a national chain. 22 The actual breakthrough for
such help came in 1973 when Kelso enlisted the aid of Senator Russell
Long. 23 Senator Long prepared legislation which was an attempt to

14. Id.
15. Id. at 17.

16.

Id.

17. Id. Kelso contrasts this view to that of Karl Marx who viewed labor as
the only factor of production and the machine as congealed labor. Thus, Marx
would insist that those laborers who built the machine are those who should receive
its wealth.
18. Id. at 18 n.9, citing Staff of Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., Broadening the Ownership of New Capital: ESOP's and Other Alternatives
(1976).
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. At the time, Long was Senate Finance Committee Chairman. Id.

EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN

1988]

prevent the collapse of the Penn Central Railroad. 24 Although the
bill was ultimately diluted in committee to no more than a mere
study, Senator Long did manage to help the legislation clear the full
Senate floor. 25 The amended bill would have provided for employee
ownership of Conrail.

26

The next obstacle was the threat presented by the 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). This contained a prohibition of an employer corporation from extending credit to an ESOP
trust to obtain a loan to acquire employer securities. 27 Through
Senator Long's efforts, ERISA was amended to provide an exception
for ESOPs. 2s By 1976, the concept had gained enough support that
the Internal Revenue Service's proposed ESOP regulations, which
proponents of employee ownership viewed as "chilling," caused
Congress to publicly rebuke the Service for "attempting to frustrate
congressional intent .
"29 By 1979, Congress was tying federal
aid to the establishment of ESOP programs.30
IV.

THE STRUCTURE OF AN ESOP

The goal of the Weirton employees was the purchase of assets of
the Weirton Division from National. The establishment of an ESOP
became the mechanism for the acquisition of funds necessary for the
purchase as well as modernization of the plant."' The term "ESOP,"
defined within the Internal Revenue Code (Code), provided the

24.
25.

Id.
Id.

26. Id. Responding to the demise of Penn Central, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 was amended by Senator Long to allow employee ownership
of the newly-created Conrail Corporation. After clearing the full Senate, the Conference Committee weakened the ESOP amendment to a mere study. This study
"ultimately rejected the idea as impractical." Id.
27.

Id.

28. Id. Granados also states: "[I]n 1974, Senator Long amended the Trade
Act to require a preference for ESOP firms in the government's efforts to assist
firms in foreign trade impacted industries. Finally, Long . . .championled] the Tax

Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plan ("TRASOP") in ...that year." Id.
29.

Id.

30. Id. at 20. For example, the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No.
96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980), which gave Chrysler its recapitalization mechanism,
required establishment of an ESOP as a condition of federal assistance. An additional
act authorized the Small Business Administration to give loan guarantees to ESOP's
for acquiring 51 % control of a company. Granados further points out that Economic
Development funds were disbursed with a preference for ESOP projects. Granados,
supra note 13, at 20.
31. Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 77.
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financial incentives which would attract potential lenders.32
The specific plan utilized in Weirton is called a leveraged ESOP.
The key characteristic of this plan is that it allows the borrowing of
money for the purchase of qualifying employer securities.33 In essence,
it serves as a financing vehicle. First, an ESOP trust, called an ESOT,
is formed 4 Next, the employer contracts to sell to the leveraged
ESOP, and the leveraged ESOP agrees to purchase stock from the
employer at an agreed price. The ESOT borrows money from qualified lenders to purchase the company's stock, and the company
guarantees the loan, using stock issued to the ESOT as collateral.33
This ESOT money is then paid to the employer in payment for the
shares the ESOT has contracted to purchase. 6 The employer now
has the funds to finance the purchase and then repays the loan
annually so that the ESOT can repay its loan. 7
The advantage of this plan over conventional debt financing is
primarily tax-related. The following scenario, derived from figures
supplied by the 1986 Tax Management Inc., provides an excellent
illustration of this advantage. 8 If a corporation borrowed $1,000,000
directly for a ten year period, it would repay the lender $1,440,000
in principal and interest. Since the interest is deductible, at a 50016
bracket, the after-tax cash cost is $1,220,000. However, if the corporation used a leveraged ESOP, the pre-tax amount remains the
same. Since the tax code allows deductions for both the interest and
the principal for the ESOT contributions, the same 50% tax bracket
corporations now can exclude $720,000. 39 Thus the ESOP financing
provides an after-tax savings of $500,000. In addition, the aggregate
compensation of the Weirton participants' contributions used to pay

32. Tax Management, Tax Management, Inc., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. AA-I (November 24, 1986). ESOP is defined in § 4975(e)(7) of the
Internal Revenue Code as "[t]he stock, which is held by one or more tax-exempt
trusts . . . [and] may be acquired through direct employer contributions or with the
proceeds of a loan to the trust. Dividends paid on stock held in trust for employees
may be distributed to employees or may be held in trust." Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tax Management, Tax Management, Inc., The Bureau of National Af-

fairs, Inc. A-2 (February 16, 1987).

39. Id. If a corporation's tax bracket is 50%70, the deduction of one half of
the total of the principle ($1,000,000) and interest ($440,000) would amount to
$720,000. Id.
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off the principal of the ESOP loans are fully deductible up to the
lesser of $30,000 or 25o under Code section 413(e)(3). 0
The employees in an ESOP receive their stock interest by becoming
a participant in the plan. 4' If an employee meets the requirements as
specified in the plan, the stock or cash that has been contributed to
the Trust is allocated to his account. The amount accumulated is
proportionate to the participant's compensation. Entitlement to this
account is tied to a vesting schedule through Code section 411. Many
variations of the vesting schedule exist subject to compliance with
the Code.

42

"While the stock is held in the Trust, and dividends paid on it
can immediately be 'passed through' to the employees to provide
them with additional income ... [or] they may be used to accelerate
repayment of the loan or used within the trust to purchase stock or
other investments ....
"41 In addition, if, as was the case in Weirton,
the leveraged ESOP held non-publicly traded shares, voting rights
are required only with respect to a corporate matter which (by law
or charter) must be decided by more than a majority of outstanding
common stock."
The actual terms agreed upon in the Disclosure Document were
that:
Weirton would be initially owned by its employees through a trust
under an ESOP. The ESOP will acquire up to 6,650,000 shares of
Weirton's authorized Common Stock,-of which 6,500,000 shares will

40. In response to an inquiry dated December 27, 1982, from T. L. Bryan,
the organizational president of the new company, the Internal Revenue Service issued
a determination of I.R.C. § 413. Since the ESOP revisions of 1983 were still
uncertain, the reply stated the 25% and $30,000 figures cited in the text were correct.
Determination Letter, Acquisition of Assets of the Weirton Steel Division and
Establishment of Weirton Steel Corporation Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Sec.
7, 1-3 (January 11, 1984).
41. Granados, supra note 13, at 23-24.
42. Id. Weirton chose to have full and immediate vesting of allocated stock.
Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 79. However, Weirton profited by the
Vermont Asbestos Group (VAG) employee buy-out. After financing of $1,500,000
was obtained and the stock value increased 4000% ($50 to $2000), employees sold
enough shares to a local businessman that they lost control of the company. Olson,
Union Experiences With Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised By
ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases and Co-Operatives, Wis. L. REv. 729, 743-46

(1982). Therefore, the Weirton ESOP has non-assignability of ESOP accounts until
stock is distributed to the participants. Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 80.
43. Tax Management, Tax Management, Inc., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. A-24, 25 (April 14, 1986).
44.

Id.
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be acquired by issuing a promissory note to Weirton at the time the
acquisition is completed. As the note is repaid in the future by annual
Weirton contributions to ESOP, the acquired stock will be allocated
to ESOP participants according to their relative compensation. Depending on the then existing circumstances, the ESOP may commence
distribution of allocated Weirton stock to participants who request it
on and after July 1, 1988. A referendum, with participants voting on
a "one man/one vote" basis, will be taken to detemine whether, in
the future, ownership of Weirton stock other than by the ESOP ...
would be allowed .... ESOP participants will have rights by means
of "pass through" voting to direct the voting of stock on all issues,
except that their rights to vote in the elections of Weirton's directors
45
will be limited.

V.

THE

EVOLUTION OF THE WEIRTON

ESOP

The eighteen-month period between the March 2, 1982, meeting in
National's board room and September 23, 1983, the date on which
the employees voted by a margin of eight-to-one to purchase the
plant, was filled with constant activities and decisions. The first step
was the organization of the Joint Study Committee (JSC), a joint
effort by the ISU, the IGU, and non-represented employees including
Weirton's managers (acting on their own behalf, rather than National's). 46 "The primary goal of the Joint Study Committee was to
investigate and determine whether the Division, operating as an
independent company, could be economically viable in conducting
the operations of an integrated steel mill." ' 47 The twenty-five man
committee, which incorporated under West Virginia law on June 22,
1982, as a not-for-profit corporation, began by hiring Wall Street
experts. 48 Funding was received from the State of West Virginia, the
ISU, IGU, retirees, management, employees, and various community
49
and civic groups.

After interviewing two of the nation's most prestigious firms,5 0 the
committee chose McKinsey & Company, Inc. to complete a feasibility
study. 5' The basis for the decision was twofold: (1) that firm's

45.
46.

Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 14.

47.

Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The company heard detailed presentations by Booz Allen and Arthur D.
Little. Joint Study Committee News Release, April 2, 1982.
51. Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 15.
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impressive credentials and the number of people whom they would
dedicate to the study and (2) their extensive marketing study experience in the world-wide steel and container industry.12 The hiring of
such a blue-chip adviser was from the outset part of the Committee's
strategy. Since Weirton would be a $1 billion-a-year company and a
member of the Fortune 500, the Committee wanted "a report which
' 53
would be unimpeachable on Wall Street."

The feasibility report (McKinsey Study), issued four months later
on July 26, 1982, for a fee of $500,000, concluded that an independent Weirton would work, "but only if the employees are prepared to accept significantly lower total compensation ... and if,
and only if, union and management can forge the leadership necessary
to shape and direct the new organization. ' 5 4 The approach centered
on two parallel queries: (1) market outlook and (2) industry cost
position." This focus produced projected demand for Weirton's,
principle product lines, projected price levels and margins under
several scenarios, and optimal product mix.5 6 Based on this analysis,
the McKinsey Study concluded that all employees would have to
accept a thirty-two percent reduction in pay, the new Weirton would
have to invest to be a viable fully-integrated producer (i.e., rebuild
one coke battery), and the company would have to cut operating
personnel.

7

During the four-month period when the study was being prepared,
both the JSC and the community remained active. Communications,
in a town flooded with ever-present rumors, were an essential. The
JSC Journal, a newsletter relaying important messages, began distribution on March 30, 1982. A telephone Message Center was established to answer specific, individualized questions concerning the
plan. 8 A series of speaking engagements were held throughout the
52. Joint Study Committee Journal News Release, April 2, 1982.
53. Rowe, supra note 5, at 36.
54. McKinsey & Co. Study [hereinafter McKinsey Studyk, Assessing the
Feasibility of an Independent Weirton Steel, Sec. 2, 1 (July 26, 1982).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 4. In addition, the McKinsey Study stated:
Operating costs must be cut by another $25 million annually to reach a
competitive position .... Cost saving investments in such items as the second
continuous caster will result in fewer management and union employees.
Although we have not been able to study manpower reduction in depth, we
do note the immediate need to reduce salaried employees and the eventual
need, by the late 1980's to reduce total employment to approximately 7,000.

Id.
58.

Joint Study Committee Journal News Release, April 16, 1982.
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area, educating the community about ESOP. The community rallied;
billboards proclaiming "We Can Do It" and "Let's Save Weirton"
went up around town. Green ribbons, symbolic of a fresh beginning,
appeared on car doors, shop windows, trees, and telephone poles. A
sense of survival had ignited a community spirit, and a civic crusade
ensued.
On April 27th, the JSC hired Alan Lowenstein and John Curtis,
as co-counsels.5 9 The original concept was for Curtis to handle the
drafting of the ESOP document and for Lowenstein to establish a
financing package and negotiate an asset price with National. 60 The
Lowenstein firm, having had extensive experience with ESOPs, had
been recommended by National. This recommendation was, in retrospect, an ominous sign. 6' Finally, on May 19, 1982, stating that
the conceptual understanding of labor and management on the JSC
was opposed to that taken by Mr. Lowenstein, the two mutually
terminated the contract, and the firm of Willkie, Farr & Gallagher
was hired to represent the employees .62
In addition, since the JSC needed to estimate National's liabilities
for pensions and other benefits if it closed the plant, the actuarial
firm of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby was hired. 63 The results
of this study, issued Novemebr 9, 1982, showed that National's
liability in the event of a shutdown would be $770 million, a fact
Weirton used as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with National. 64
After interviewing such blue-chip firms as Merrill Lynch, Oppenheimer, and Goldman Sachs, the JSC selected Lazard Freres, which
had engineered New York City's bailout, as its investment banker. 65
According to David L. Robertson, the ISU's attorney, the Committee
felt Lazard Freres had a sense of labor's concern in such a transaction."

59. Lowenstein was from the firm of Lowenstein, Sandier, Brochin, Kohl,
Fisher & Boylan of Roseland, New Jersey. Masters, Trust Closes Culture Gap in
Weirton Buy-out Deal, 6 Legal Times 32, col. 1-2 (March 10, 1983).
60. Robertson Interview, supra note 1.
61.

Id.

62. Joint Study Committee Journal News Release, May 19, 1982.
63. Towers Actuarial Study, supra note 9, at 1.
64. Id. The actual figures cited in the Towers Actuarial Report showed
Weirton's share of the assets were $489,380,000. Of this, $350 million was in reserve
to cover pensions. The additional $400 monthly supplement awarded in case of
plant shutdown increased National's liability to $770.6 million. Id. at 6.
65. Rowe, supra note 5, at 38.
66. Robertson Interview, supra note 1.
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Thus, the cast of principle players was set, and on September 29,
1982, "[w]hether National had intended to or not, it now found
itself negotiating for real, in the big leagues." ' 67 "Lawyers who
participated in the deal, as well as outside observers, emphasized its
complexity. "6 Negotiations continued, and finally an Agreement in
Principle was reached on March 11, 1983.69
A summary of these proposals which were, in fact, ultimately
adopted included a purchase price of $66 million in cash, an amount
equal to twenty-two percent of the depreciated book value. 70 The
purchase was to be financed from a $120 million line of credit that
Lazard Freres had secured from a consortium of banks headed by
7
Citibank with an interest rate of only 1.5 percent over prime. '
Additionally, a mortgage, held by National, was to be paid over
fifteen years with no payment on the principal for six years, and the
ten percent interest rate was deferred until the new company reached
a net worth of $100 million. 72 Moreover, to permit raising of new
funds from banks, mortgage payments to National would be subordinated to payments on other bank loans. 73 Twenty-five percent of
the cost of current assets would be paid in cash at closing; the
remainder would be repaid over 28 years with interest of ten percent
74
or less.
Perhaps the most favorable item negotiated was National's assumption of certain pension obligations that reduced the workers'
cut in compensation by a third. 75 Of crucial interest to the new

67. Rowe, supra note 5, at 38.
68. Masters, supra note 59.
69. Agreement in Principle, (March 11, 1983), Assessing the Feasibility of an
Independent Weirton Steel, Sec. 5, 1 (July 26, 1982) [hereinafter Agreement in
Principle].
70. These figures were assessed by both the Towers Actuarial Study, supra
note 9, and the McKinsey Study, supra note 54.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. According to the Disclosure Document, National retained certain pension
liabilities for the following:
These included charges for certain pension funding (1982 total pension cost$53.6 million) and cost for retiree life insurance and health care benefits (1982
cost-$8.7 million), accounted for approximately 12.7% of the Division's
overall labor costs which were, in effect, already saved. In addition, various
decreases (or failures to increase) certain, components of compensation were
effectuated either on or about April 1, '1982 ...were credited toward the
32% deduction.
Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 18.
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employee-owners was the fact that pension benefits received from
National would never be reduced. In other words, each employee
would be vested under National's pension plan with his accrued
benefit at transfer, whether or not he had worked ten years. 76 Future
service with Weirton would be added to years with National, and
the two companies would share the costs of such payments proportionately. Finally, National agreed to provide a five year safety net.
Thus, if the plant closed during the first five years, National would
still assume responsibility for increased pensions, including the $400
With the
special monthly payments made to each employee. 77
issuance of the McKinsey Study, Weirton's workers became aware
that reductions were inevitable. They were, of course, a necessity.
Additionally, the JSC's emphasis upon instructive communications
helped the individual worker understand the basic concept of employee-ownership. Over the next ten years, each employee would
forego a salary of approximately $6,000 annually.7 8 Yet, if the
company remained profitable, the value of the accumulated stock
79
could increase to as much as $90,000.

One of the most difficult areas concerned the issue of pensions.
80
The employees felt that the Rule of 65 and 70-80's was sacrosanct.
Additionally, this was a potential area of division between the older
employees, who with early retirement under National could have
received full pension benefits plus an extra $4000 per month if the
mill closed, and those younger, who would not receive such security.
Thus from a personal viewpoint, the older worker had more to lose
by buying the plant-lower wages plus the possiblility of closure
under a new company without the vast financial resources of National. Although several employee lawsuits were filed to block the
sale,8" the employee vote in late September ratified the agreement by
82
an eight-to-one margin.

76. Id.
77. Agreement in Principle, supra note 59.
78. Id.
79. Rowe, supra note 5, at 38.
80. According to the Disclosure Document, the Rule of 65 allows any
employee to retire who is under age 55 but has at least 20 years continuous service
and whose age and continuous service equals 65 or more (i.e., 45 and 20) but less
than 80. The 70-80 rule allows retirement if the worker's age (which must be at
least 55) and service equals 70 (i.e., 55 and 15) or whose combined age and service
equals 80 or more (i.e., 52 and 28). Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 53-54.
81. On March 30, 1983, 171 hourly employees sued National and the ISU in
United States District Court alleging that the sale would entitle them to pension and
severance benefits under collectively bargained pension and labor agreements (the
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VI.

ISSUES RAISED UNDER AN ESOP

What happens when labor governs itself through an ESOP? Obviously, there are both problems and potentialities. In the Weirton
ESOP, the administration of that firm would have to provide for
two interrelated but conceptually separable functions: organization's
governance and the management of work. 3 Normally, in labor law,
a company is assumed to be divided into two components: management and labor, usually represented by a union. Such a model is
advantageous. "It recognizes explicitly the interests of labor and
provides for representatives of the workers to bargain with manage-.
ment on a wide range of issues." '8 4 In bargaining situations, workers
often assume that their gains are at management's expense, and
management assumes the same.
In employee ownership, these traditonal roles are much more
complex. This is a new concept in relatively uncharted fields. According to the Employee Stock Ownership Plan Association, about
5,000 ESOP plans are in effect nationwide, yet these are mostly
modest profit-sharing plans in which workers hold a small amount
of stock.85 "Workers probably hold majority control of the stock in
only a few hundred of these plans.... "8a6
The concept of the corporation's control under employee-ownership
has been subject to much dispute. Because an ESOP is set up as a
trust in which the trustees have legal ownership, the legal owners,
the trustees of the plan, have the right to exercise the voting power

"Sutton Action"). Another suit in April, 1983 (the "Brunner Action"), similarly
charged denial of these rights and additionally asserted that elimination of these
would violate ERISA. Another action (the "Dhayer Action") by 31 salaried employees claimed the sale constituted a shutdown, thereby entitling them to full
pension and severance rights. Declaratory relief as to the Sutton and Brunner actions
was granted on July 8, 1983. The Dhayer action was settled later. Disclosure
Document, supra note 2, at 71-72.
82. Rowe states that one possible reason for the lack of division among older
and younger employees was the mill's domination of the community. Thus, employees perceived the mill as a link between the generations. The older employees
still had a substantial stake in the company's success since their children, nephews,
brothers-in-law, etc., still depended upon the mill for a livelihood. Rowe, supra
note 5, at 43.
83. Whyte, Worker Ownership, Participationand Control: Toward a Theoretical Model, 14 Policy Sciences 1 (1982).

84.
85.

Id. at 3.
Corrigan, Workers at Weirton Steel See Only One Way to Save Their

Failing Plant: Buy It, 15 National Journal 1672, 1677 (August 13, 1983).

86.

Id.
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of the stock held by the trust.8 7 Yet these voting rights are heavily
regulated by the Internal Revenue Code if the corporation is to utilize
the substantial tax benefits which the Code provides to ESOPs. First,
all ESOPs must satisfy the requirements of section 409(e) with respect
to voting rights on employer securities."8 In the case of Registration
Type securities, the Code requires that a participant vote on all
corporate matters.*89 The voting rights controversy surrounds participants' voting on all corporate matters. Those advocating these
rights feel that employee-owners should have a say in how the
corporation is managed, asserting that this improves employee motivation, participation, and productivity. 90 Such control, they feel,
establishes a real change in the status of employees. 91
On the other hand, opponents argue that employees do not have
the expertise "to evaluate complex and critical issues of corporate
policy." 92 To educate and inform the employees in order that they
might vote using sound business judgment poses two additional
problems: "(1) the added paperwork and procedural burdens and (2)
the disclosure of confidential information." 93 Furthermore, opponents
counter the increased productivity argument using empirical data
which shows no positive correlation between voting rights and productivity. 94
Legal issues also exist in relationship to potential conflicts of
interest between the union's role in representing employees as employees and in representing employees as owner on boards of directors.
In addition, if the employees gain control over the employer, a

87. Granados, supra note 13, at 31.
88. Section 409(e) states in pertinent parts that an employer of registration
type securities meets IRS requirements only if each participant "is entitled to direct
the plan as to the manner in which voting rights under employer securities ...
allocated to the account ... are to be exercised with respect to a corporate matter

...must be decided by more than a majority vote of outstanding common shares
voted." I.R.C. §'409(e) (1986).
89. The Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1934) requires
registration if the corporation has assets of at least $1,000,000 and 500 or more
stockholders. Tax Management, Tax Management, Inc., Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc. A-24 n.215 (December 23, 1985).
90. Granados, supra note 13, at 33.
91. Id.
92.

Id. at 36.

93. Id. at 34.
94. See Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, EMPLOYEE OW-NERSHM"
(Report to the Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Project No. 99-6-09433, 1979) which "show[s] a negative relationship between

voting rights and profitability." Granados, supra note 13, at 33 n.76.
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conflict may arise concerning the protection of employee benefits. 9
"A union may organize its stockholder members to aid them in
acting collectively, but the union risks conflicts of interest when it
becomes an institutional owner of a company for which it represents
employees in collective bargaining.'' 96 Thus, union representatives
must be aware of the legal obligations to the constituency which they
represent.
VII.

THE WEIRTON SOLUTION

The division of ownership in the Weirton ESOP will give bluecollar workers approximately seventy percent of the stock with whitecollar workers receiving the rest.9 7 Yet, stock evidences not only
economic ownership but also some measurement of control over the
corporation. Such control is exercised through the stockholders'
voting rights. 9s Therefore, Weirton's ESOP had a variety of factors
to weigh in the allocation of these rights. First, to reap the substantial
tax benefits, the Code requirements had to be satisfied. 99 Second,
since Weirton is a Delaware corporation operating in West Virginia,
compliance with the corporate laws of both states was required.
Finally, if the employees were to be owners of the new company,
they wanted some voice in the operation of the company. Therefore,
the structure of the voting rights to Weirton's stock is complex.
Delaware corporate law requires that stockholder action involves
decision-making in (1) the election and removal of members of the
Board of Directors and (2) structural changes (i.e., amendments to
incorporation such as changes in authorized capital) and major
transactions (i.e., mergers, consolidations, or dissolution).0 To comply with the Delaware law, Weirton's charter provides that during
the time that shareholder stock is held by the ESOT, all shareholders
shall participate by voting upon those transactions listed above and
that an approval of such issues shall require a minimum of a twothirds majority of stockholders. I0 ' In general, Weirton stockholders

95. Olson, supra note 42, at 780.
96. Id.
97. Corrigan, supra note 85, at 1678.
98. Some claim that an ESOP is an attempt at "union busting." However,
since the mechanism is quite flexible, the degree of worker control is determined by
the way it is employed. Olson, supra note 42, at 753.

99.
100.
101.

Id.
Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 80.
Id. at 81.
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may vote in person or by proxy. However, only the "record"
stockholder is entitled to vote. 10 2 Since the "record" stockholder
listed on the stock transfer books of Weirton is the ESOP Trustee,
this Trustee is the sole holder of record and the only stockholder
entitled to vote. 103 Yet, the ESOP contains provisions that the participants can have "pass through" voting to direct the Trustee's vote
on certain matters. 04
Weirton's By-Laws state that the general management of the
corporation shall be vested in the Board of Directors. 105 Unlike most
enterprises, however, the Board includes Union representatives. This
was done to ensure that the Union would have an adequate voice in
this body.' ° 6 Therefore, the Board is comprised of not less than ten
nor more than fourteen members, of which at least three directors
are designated by the Union.' ° 7 For example, in a twelve member
Board, the three Union members will be determined by the ESOP
Election Committee, comprised of Weirton's independent directors.
This committee will instruct the Trustee to cast all shares of the
ESOP stock for the current Union president, two other Union
designees, and the current Chief Executive Officer. 0 8 The remaining
votes will be cast for individuals who are neither nominated by nor
requested by any labor organization or employee of Weirton.1°9 For
at least the first five years of operation, the majority of these directors
will be independent directors who are neither employees of Weirton
nor affiliated with any labor organization." 0 So long as Weirton

102. Weirton Steel Corporation By-Laws, (By-Laws) Acquisition of Assets of
Weirton Steel Division and Establishment of Weirton Steel Corporation Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, Sec. 10, 1 (January 11, 1984) [hereinafter By-Laws].
103. The Independent Trustee is selected by Weirton's Board. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In a similar situation concerning an ESOP formation at Pan Am, union
leaders felt that "even one director, trusted and chosen by them for his competence,
[could] serve the necessary function." Olson, supra note 42, at 779.
107. By-Laws, supra note 102, at 5.
108. Disclosure Document, supra note 2, at 81.
109. Id. In the alternative, a larger number is allowed for the union if the
composition of the Board is increased to preserve adequate Union representation.
Id.
110. Id. At the outset these directors included Eugene Keilin, Senior Vice
President of Lazard Freres; Harvey Sperry, partner in Willkie Farr & Gallager;
Gordon Hurlbert, past President of a subsidiary of Westinghouse; Lawrence Issacs,
Vice President and General Manager of the Aircraft Components Group of TRW;
Richard Schubert, President of the American Red Cross; David L. Robertson,
Counsel for the ISU; Irving Bluestone, Professor of Labor Studies at Wayne State
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stock remains in the ESOP, these independent directors will be
retained in office by the vote of the ESOP Trustee."'
In addition to requirements for electing Board Members, voting
procedures are divided into other categories. For the corporation's
routine matters, which require a favorable vote by only a majority
of the shares actually voted, the rule of "majority of the quorum"
is used.112 In this instance, the ESOP requests instruction from the
ESOP participants under a one man/one vote rule. The ESOP Trustee
then casts all shares in proportion to the results of that vote. For
example, if 5,000 votes of 7,000 eligible votes are cast, the majority
of the quorum requirement has been met. Furthermore, if the vote
were three-to-two for affirmative action, the ESOP Trustee would
cast a ballot for all shares held by the ESOP (both allocated and
unallocated), voting sixty percent of the shares for and forty percent
of the shares against the question. 3
On the other hand, if a matter is not routine and demands more
than a majority of the quorum, the ESOP Trustee must request
voting instructions based upon stock allocated to participants' accounts, rather than the one man/one vote rule." 4 In this case, the
Trustee votes in accordance with the votes cast. Additionally, the
ratio of affirmative and negative votes is calculated, thereby indicating the manner in which the Trustee votes those shares still remaining
in the ESOP Suspense Account." 5
Conflicts of interests in collective bargaining situations which occur
when employee-owners have union designates sitting on the Board
of Directors are not, at present, an issue. The trend of the NLRB
has been to use a "degree of control" test to determine whether or
not the designate is to retain the NLRB of employee." 6 Additionally,
University; Walter Bish, President of the ISU; Herbert Elish, Sr., Vice President of
International Paper Company; Robert Loughhead, CEO of Weirton; and Phillip
Smith, past Chairman and CEO of Copperweld. Bish, Bluestone, and Robertson
were the Union designees. Id. at 23-26.
111. Id. at 81.
112. Id. at 80. The Majority of the Quorum Rule requires that one half the
total outstanding shares has been voted. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. In Union Furniture Co., N.L.R.B. 1307 (1946), the NLRB excluded
employees stockholders from the unit because they held a substantial share of stock
and because of matters of fundamental labor policy. In Brookings Plywood Corp.,
98 N.L.R.B. 795 (1952), employee stockholders were also excluded from the bargaining unit because they had a guaranteed wage, a separate grievance procedure
and the right to bump nonstockholder-employees from desireable jobs. Olson, supra

note 42, at 782.
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the NLRB considers whether there is preferential treatment of employee stockholders conflicting with the interest of non-stockholding
employees. However, in the Weirton case, where all stock is held by
the ESOP, no conflict arises between employee and non-employee
stockholders since only one category of owners exists. Significantly,
a community of interest is retained where all employees are stockholders. Thus, the rule established in Everett Plywood and Door,
Corp. applies." 7 Everett stands for the proposition that the established rule for excluding employees who have an effective voice in
management does not apply to 1000 employee-owned companies." '
The National Labor Relations Board stated:
The mere fact that an employee also has the privileges of a stockholder
is not sufficient to debar him from availing himself, in his capacity
as an employee, of the rights of employees to engage in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.... [S]tockholder employees not only have a proprietary
interest in the employer-corporation, but also have an interest, at least
as great, in their status as paid workers. 1 9
As far as the union's dual role as a bargaining agent and competitor, the NLRB and the courts have held that stock ownership
"is legally distinguishable from stock ownership by the union or
union pension fund."' 120 At Weirton, the individual union members
who own stock are in no sense competing with their employer,
thereby eliminating a conflict of interest. As employees, they depend
upon the corporation for their livelihood; moreover, as stockholders,
they have an interest in protecting both their savings and their
pensions. Thus, the union is not sitting on both sides of the bargaining table anymore than the employer is sitting in the union
meetings. "Nothing in labor law policy frowns upon such an arrangement so long as the conflicts of interest . .. are not present,
and ... the union's fiduciary and representational duties are not

compromised."121

117.

Everett Plywood & Door Corp., 105 N.L.R.B.

17 (1953).

Here all

employees were stockholders, and had the right to appeal to but not overrule the
board of directors on certain matters. The NLRB did exclude supervisors who were
employees but allowed the production and maintenance employee-stockholders to
remain within the unit. Olson, supra note 42.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.

120.
121.

Olson, supra note 42, at 790.
Id.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

As the employees of Weirton discovered, an ESOP is no guaranteed
panacea to a plant closing. Both management and union must work
together to make Weirton successful. Yet, the example Weirton
provides must not be ignored. First, the employees allowed adequate
time to plan a successful takeover. Second, they employed experts
to analyze potential profits and cost reductions. A third and crucial
element was leadership. The JSC, although at times cumbersome,
provided the necessary organizational structure. Utilizing the foresight
to employ expert financial and legal assistance, they remained involved in the process itself. In fact, it was through their efforts that
the employees backed the plan. A fourth element in the success was
adequate financing. Here, the ESOP's built-in tax breaks proved to
be a boon. Finally, although disputes arose during negotiations, all
parties shared a positive stake in the ESOP's success.
The successful rebirth of the new Weirton is dependent upon the
success of the ESOP. Undoubtedly, National's announcement on
March 2, 1982, was a potential death knoll which reverberated
throughout both the plant and the community. Yet, through the
creation of an employee stock ownership plan, a community and a
company which sensed approaching death created a new company,
a "New Beginning." The preparation and implementation were slow
and sometimes painful. Hopefully, the efforts will prove fruitful and
develop into a vital and productive company.
Jane Anderson

